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Earnings management has become an avenue for the managers to report determined 
corporate performance which later led to the collapse of the corporations. Corporate 
governance mechanisms instituted to control the managers’ opportunistic action 
which reduces agency cost of the firms. The present study investigates the 
relationship between the board of directors, audit committee and firm characteristics 
and earnings management practice in Nigerian listed companies. The study also 
investigates the earnings management practice in the pre- and post-Corporate 
Governance Code 2011 periods. The study argues that interaction of institutional 
ownership between audit committee and earnings management practice mitigates 
opportunistic behaviors of managers. The study measured the effectiveness of the 
revised Nigerian Corporate Governance Code 2011 mechanisms which came into 
effect in 2011. Data were gathered from 405 non-financial company-year 
observations drawn from the population of Nigerian listed companies for the period 
of 2009-2013. With reference to the agency theory, political cost theory and ethical 
theory, the present study finds that the revised Corporate Governance Code 2011 has 
a significant effect in reducing the level of earnings management practice in the post 
Corporate Governance Code 2011 period; corporate governance mechanisms 
significantly reduce earnings management practice; and institutional ownership 
interaction effect in the audit committee is significantly more active in reducing 
earnings management. Based on the findings, the study suggests that for future 
policy effective corporate governance is required to mitigate earnings management 
activities. The regulators need to encourage participation of institutional ownership 
in the board of public listed companies.   
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Abstrak 
 
Pengurusan perolehan telah menjadi saluran bagi pengurus untuk melaporkan 
prestasi syarikat di bawah seliaan mereka yang telah membawa keruntuhan syarikat. 
Mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dimulakan untuk mengawal tindakan oportunis 
pengurus yang tidak berasaskan isu agensi. Kajian ini menyiasat hubungan antara 
lembaga pengarah, jawatankuasa audit, ciri-ciri firma, dan pengurusan perolehan 
oleh syarikat yang tersenarai di Nigeria. Kajian juga menyiasat sejauh mana 
pengurusan perolehan syarikat dalam tempoh pra dan pascakod 2011. Hujah kajian 
ini adalah interaksi pemilikan institusi dalam jawatankuasa audit mengurangkan 
tingkah laku oportunis pengurus. Kajian ini mengukur kesan kod tadbir urus 
korporat di Nigeria yang telah disemak semula dan dikuatkuasakan pada tahun 2011. 
Data kajian daripada 405 syarikat bukan kewangan dalam tahun pemerhatian yang 
mana syarikat ini diambil dari populasi syarikat yang tersenarai di Nigeria dari 
tempoh 2009-2013. Dengan merujuk teori agensi, teori kos politik dan teori etika, 
kajian ini mendapati bahawa kod tadbir urus korporat yang telah disemak semula 
dan dilaksanakan pada tahun 2011 memberi kesan signifikan  dalam mengurangkan 
tahap pengurusan pendapatan dalam tempoh pascapelaksanaan. Mekanisme tadbir 
urus korporat juga memberi kesan signifikan dalam mengurangkan pengurusan 
perolehan dan interaksi pemilikan institut memberi kesan terhadap jawatankuasa 
audit yang mana jawatankuasa ini secara signifikannya lebih aktif dalam 
mengurangkan pengurusan pendapatan. Berdasarkan dapatan kajian, kajian ini 
mencadangkan yang tadbir urus syarikat yang efektif diperlukan untuk mengawal 
aktiviti pengurusan perolehan. Pihak penggubal undang-undang perlu 
mempertimbangkan penyertaan secara mandatori oleh pemilikan institusi dalam 
lembaga pengarah syarikat awam yang tersenarai. 
 
Katakunci: pengurusan pendapatan, mekanisme tadbir urus syarikat, ciri-ciri firma, 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The business activities of quoted companies are very important for the 
public, specifically, and the nation, generally, because companies provide 
the goods, services and resources to meet their needs (Kehinde & 
Olanrewaju, 2010). Those quoted companies attract investors capital for 
further improvement.  Investments in listed companies are expected to yield 
good returns which in turn benefit investors and economy of the nation. 
Good yield returns of the firms motivate investors to invest capital in listed 
firms because investors are always profit seekers and they are ready to 
invest in any economy, but there is problem of panic or uncertainty of losing 
their investment due to accounting policies, inadequate regulations or 
provisions that regulate the financial activities in the economy (Kajola, 
2008). For the success of investments in the Nigerian economy, the 
government is expected to make good policies and regulations that 
guarantee good financial reporting atmosphere that will guarantee safety, 
profit and security for the investors in order to institutionalize their 
confidence (SEC Code, 2011).  
 
Most investors and other stakeholders have interests in financial reporting 
because financial reporting contains information about earnings from their 
investments. Reported investments earnings are considered to be of valued 
relevance by the shareholders in estimating future investment returns (Das & 
The contents of 
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Extra Analyses Tables  
 
Contribution of individual variables (corporate tax and firm size) that are highly correlated  
 
Table 1 
     General Model 1 
    Complete Model Absence of CT Absence of FL 
Variables Sign coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
BOIN - 0.008 1.170 0.010 1.470 0.006 0.860 
CEOD + 0.005 0.940 0.007 1.160 0.005 0.900 
DH + 0.007 1.600 0.005 1.150 0.010 2.190 
FEAC - -0.003 -0.630 -0.004 -0.780 -0.001 -0.200 
ACIN - -0.016 -1.410 -0.017 -1.470 -0.016 -1.330 
ACS - -0.002 -1.340 -0.002 -1.200 -0.001 -0.620 
CT - 0.006 3.120     0.008 4.180 
CP - -0.007 -2.620 -0.004 -1.420 0.001 0.370 
IO - -0.001 -0.240 -0.001 -0.370 0.000 0.040 
FZ + 0.228 4.770 0.262 5.550     
FL - -0.372 -12.230 -0.390 -12.930 -0.288 -11.300 
CFO - -0.292 -24.750 -0.290 -24.370 -0.295 -24.410 
LOSS - -0.008 -2.750 -0.010 -3.540 -0.008 -2.750 
IDUSTRY - 0.001 2.300 0.001 2.460 0.001 2.020 
Constant + 1.428 50.080 1.425 49.460 1.473 53.230 
R-Squared     0.695   0.688   0.678 














    Analysis of Additional Moderation 
    Normal Model Addition of IO*DH 
Variables Sign coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
Constant + 1.310 23.170 1.285 21.780*** 
BOIN - 0.013 1.910** 0.134 1.960** 
CEOD + 0.008 1.390* 0.007 1.23 
DH + 0.008 1.950** 0.036 1.840** 
FEAC - 0.108 3.540*** 0.109 3.560*** 
ACIN - 0.052 0.880 0.632 1.07 
ACS - 0.007 0.610 0.015 1.15 
CT + 0.006 3.160*** 0.006 3.03*** 
CP - -0.009 -3.050*** -0.009 -3.140*** 
FZ +/- 0.260 5.490*** 0.257 5.440*** 
FL +/- -0.406 -13.100*** -0.410 -13.190*** 
CFO +/- -0.288 -24.840*** -0.287 -24.800*** 
LOSS +/- -0.007 -2.510*** -0.007 -2.470*** 
IDUSTRY +/- 0.001 2.120** 0.001 2.210** 
IO - -0.003 -0.670 -0.003 -0.71 
IOX*FEAC - -0.022 -3.750*** -0.023 -3.770*** 
IOX*ACIN - -0.016 -1.290* -0.017 -1.430* 
IOX*ACS - 0.000 -0.170 -0.001 -0.77 
IO*DH -     -0.006 -1.440* 
R-Squared     0.710 
 
0.712 
Adj. R2   0.698 
 
0.699 
F-value     55.890***   53.050*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
